In order to reliably assess the potential implications of this change for Poland, it is necessary to place it within a broader structural context, encompassing both the history of migration policy in the two countries and their actual position within the European migration system.
Over the past decade, Poland and Hungary have developed two fundamentally different models of managing labor migration. Beginning in the period after 2014 and the inflow of workers from Ukraine, Poland gradually transformed into an economy partially dependent on migrant labor. Mechanisms such as the simplified declaration system, relatively fast legalization procedures, and the growing role of employment agencies created an environment with a high capacity to absorb foreign labor. As a result, the number of foreigners working in Poland exceeded one million, and their share in the labor market reached nearly seven percent.
This model was not the result of a single political decision, but rather a gradual adaptation to labor shortages resulting from demographic trends, the emigration of Poles to Western Europe, and dynamic economic growth. The geopolitical factor was also crucial – proximity to Ukraine and Belarus, cultural affinity, and relatively low migration costs.
Hungary followed a completely different path. The migration policy of the governments of Viktor Orbán was dominated by strong anti-immigration rhetoric, particularly in the context of the 2015 migration crisis. At the same time, at the practical level, the state did not abandon the use of foreign labor, but subordinated it strictly to economic goals and investment policy.
Labor migration in Hungary developed in a selective and controlled manner. Unlike in Poland, no broad, bottom-up migration ecosystem emerged there. Instead, a model of “importing labor for investments” dominated, in which the inflow of workers was linked to specific industrial projects, particularly in the automotive sector and, more recently, in the battery production sector.
The result of this strategy is a fundamental structural difference. While in Poland migrants constitute a significant component of the labor market, in Hungary their share remains marginal, hovering around one percent of the workforce. This difference is systemic in nature and cannot be quickly eliminated even with significant policy changes.
The differences between Poland and Hungary are not limited to the scale of migration, but also extend to its geographical structure. Poland remains largely dependent on migration from the East. Ukrainian citizens account for around two-thirds of all foreign workers, and together with migrants from Belarus they form the dominant group that has largely shaped the functioning of the labor market.
Hungary, by contrast, has developed migration based on entirely different directions. In recent years, the importance of migrants from Asia, including China, the Philippines, and Vietnam, has clearly increased. This direction is not accidental, but results directly from investment ties and an active policy of attracting capital from Asia.
In practice, this means that Poland and Hungary largely operate in separate “migration markets.” Competition between them arises primarily with regard to migrants from Asia, while it is negligible in the case of migrants from the East.
The victory of Péter Magyar and the constitutional majority obtained by TISZA Party opens the space for deep institutional reforms. Unlike previous political changes, the current situation enables not only adjustments to sectoral policies, but also a reconstruction of legal and administrative frameworks.
However, this does not mean automatic migration liberalization in an ideological sense. A more likely scenario is one in which migration is fully subordinated to economic logic, while moving away from the political instrumentalization of the issue. One can expect greater transparency of procedures, a reduction in administrative discretion, and increased predictability of the system for employers.
Such changes could significantly improve Hungary’s operational efficiency as a labor market for migrants, particularly in sectors requiring fast and scalable recruitment.
The most sensitive area from the perspective of competition between Poland and Hungary is the automotive sector and related industries. Hungary has for years pursued a consistent policy of attracting investment in this area, offering favorable conditions for global corporations and component manufacturers.
In recent years, investments in battery production, often carried out by Asian capital, have gained particular importance. Such projects require substantial labor resources that the domestic market cannot provide. As a result, migration becomes an integral part of the investment model.
In a situation where the new government simplifies migration procedures and increases their predictability, Hungary may significantly increase its capacity to attract workers from Asia. However, it is crucial that this competition will primarily concern future migration flows rather than workers already present in Poland.
In sectors such as logistics, warehousing, and broadly understood services, Poland has an advantage that is structural and difficult to undermine. This advantage results both from the scale of the market and from geographical location and infrastructure development.
Poland serves as one of the main logistics hubs in Europe, handling flows of goods between East and West. This model generates constant and high demand for labor, which is largely met by migrants. Hungary does not possess a comparable operational base or migration infrastructure, which limits its ability to compete in this area.
A key mistake in analyzing competition between countries in migration is the assumption that it consists in “taking workers away” from each other. In reality, competition is more subtle and takes place primarily at the recruitment stage, before a migrant decides on a destination country.
In this sense, a potential policy change in Hungary may affect the availability of migrants for Poland, especially in the context of the growing importance of Asian labor markets. If Hungary is able to offer a more efficient and predictable recruitment system, it may capture part of the new migrant inflow that would otherwise have gone to Poland.
From the perspective of Polish employers, the political change in Hungary does not imply a direct threat to labor market stability, but rather signals growing competition in certain segments. This particularly concerns industrial sectors that already compete regionally for labor resources.
In the longer term, this may lead to the need to redefine recruitment strategies, diversify migration sources, and increase the importance of non-wage factors such as job stability or opportunities for professional development.
Assessing the risk for Poland requires distinguishing structural factors from short-term political impulses. Even with a dynamic increase in migration to Hungary, the difference in scale and the lack of a developed migration ecosystem limit the possibility of quickly closing the gap with Poland.
At the same time, the potential impact of changes on the availability of migrants in selected market segments cannot be entirely dismissed. The most realistic scenario is a gradual increase in Hungary’s role as a sectoral competitor, while Poland maintains its dominant position in the region.
The analysis indicates limited systemic risk for Poland; however, there is a risk of overestimating political factors. The history of migration policy in Central Europe shows that institutional changes take time, and their effects are often spread over years.
At the same time, there is a risk of underestimating investment factors. If Hungary maintains a high pace of attracting industrial capital and combines it with a more efficient migration policy, it may increase its attractiveness faster than current data would suggest.
The change of power in Hungary opens a new stage in the country’s economic policy, but does not imply an immediate shift in the balance of power in the region. Poland remains the main migration hub of Central and Eastern Europe, and its advantage stems from structural factors that are difficult to replicate.
Hungary may, however, strengthen its position in selected sectors and become a more visible participant in the competition for migrants. For Poland, this means not so much a threat as a need to closely monitor developments and adapt to a gradually evolving environment.
