In this article, we examine what can actually be said based on data and what cannot. We rely on the Global Peace Index 2025, Eurostat data, and other publicly available statistics. We focus primarily on five major EU countries: Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Poland – but not exclusively.
Our goal is not to defend or attack migration, but to calmly explain whether and how migration may be related to security.
Before comparing countries, it is worth clarifying one basic misunderstanding. A country’s security is not only about crime.
In the Global Peace Index, security is understood broadly and consists of three areas:
This is important because migration can only logically relate to part of the first area. It is not reasonable to link the number of migrants to whether a country increases its military budget or engages in armed conflict.
Even at this stage, it is clear that simple slogans do not reflect reality.
Statistical data in the EU primarily show:
What these data do not show includes, for example:
This means it is impossible to prove a simple causal link like: “increased migration → decreased security.” However, it is possible to examine whether countries with high migration see actual declines in security – and if so, in which areas.
Germany is among the countries with the highest proportion of migrants in the EU – nearly one fifth of the population. If the simple thesis about migration and threat were true, Germany would be one of the least secure countries in Europe. However, in the GPI ranking, Germany ranks 10th among EU member states and 20th globally (out of 163 countries). Although Germany dropped three positions year-on-year, this is not a significant deterioration of the overall index score (it should be noted that ranking changes depend not only on a country’s score but also on improvements in other countries, e.g., Iceland, Norway, Finland, and Japan maintained high positions despite minor point declines, and Japan even rose by 4 places).
Meanwhile, in the Global Peace Index, Germany maintains a high position, and the level of serious crime, especially homicides, has remained low and stable for years.
What is actually worsening?
Importantly, these phenomena are strongly linked to political debate and crises (pandemic, war in Ukraine, inflation), not the sheer number of migrants. The data do not show that population inflow leads to increased violence.
Conclusion: In Germany, migration has not reduced the objective level of security but has become part of social debates affecting public perception.
France often appears in debates as a country “affected by migration.” Indeed, its Global Peace Index score is weaker than Germany or Spain.
However, a closer look shows that:
These phenomena are not caused by the mere presence of migrants, but by:
Migration here is a backdrop, not the main cause. Similar issues existed in France even when migration levels were much lower.
Spain is one of the most interesting examples in the EU. It has a high proportion of migrants and, at the same time:
This does not mean migration does not create any tensions – they exist, especially in the labor market or public services – but they do not translate into increased crime or a sense of chaos.
This shows that the number of migrants alone does not determine security. How migrants are integrated into the labor market and society matters much more.
Italy has long been one of the main entry points for migrants into Europe. Nevertheless:
Problems are more local, affecting regions with weak economies and large informal sectors. This demonstrates that economic factors often matter more than migration itself.
Poland has received millions of foreigners, mainly from Ukraine, in a very short time. If migration automatically reduced security, changes should be immediately visible.
Meanwhile, data show:
Poland’s drop in security rankings is mainly due to the war on its eastern border, increased military spending, and international tensions – not migration.
Based on the Global Peace Index 2025 (world ranking 1–163), the highest-rated EU countries are (in order of ranking):
Note: not all EU countries are in the global top 10. The above are the ten highest-ranking EU member states.
Where data are disclosed:
Even among “relatively safe” EU countries, there are year-to-year fluctuations. These small changes usually result from:
At no point are there large, sudden changes indicating a dramatic impact of migration in a single year.
Below are brief characterizations of these countries in terms of security (GPI) and migration, along with what the data suggest (or do not allow us to conclude).
Ireland
Austria
Portugal
Slovenia
Czechia
Netherlands
Belgium
Hungary
Croatia
Germany
No evidence of a simple correlation
Both in the Big 5 EU countries and the “top 10” EU states, there is no simple dependency: higher migration = lower security. A high migrant share does not automatically worsen GPI scores.
GPI position changes are minor
All ranking changes between 2024–2025 in EU countries are small (a few positions), suggesting that other factors (internal policy, geopolitical conditions, militarization, public perception) have much greater long-term impact.
Migration may have indirect effects
Migration can influence the sense of security in the medium- to long-term if, for example:
However, these are separate social processes not captured directly by a single GPI number. Often, they result from political discourse – hate speech, scapegoating, simplifications, and exaggerations.
In Poland, we have repeatedly seen manipulations linking foreigners to perceived injustice or direct threats, e.g.:
Public perception is shaped by media narratives, so disproportionate reporting, false or exaggerated claims, and conflating correlation with causation can affect how migration is linked to security. But GPI data alone show no direct correlation.
EU-wide data show recurring patterns:
Migration can affect security indirectly – if it leads to exclusion, ghettoization, or labor market tensions. Where institutions function effectively, migration does not increase violence.
Based on available data, there is no proof that high migration per se reduces security in EU countries.
It can be said that:
To discuss security seriously, we must look not only at who comes, but at how the state and society function as a whole.
